Intersex individuals and words.

Yes, they do pose a problem to traditional conceptions of sex.

I can't really remember when the right wing became so concerned with trying to be the arbiters of truth in biology. It must have been around the same time J.K. Rowling started shitposting about trans people, which led to a wave of edgy anti-woke individuals making their last stand against the so-called leftist postmodern crusaders of feelings and emotion.

Hardly much has changed. Back then, it was a niche debate, with many dropout biologists joining the conversation, asserting that the scientific consensus in the field is that "if you have a dick, you're a man, and if you have a vagina, then you're a woman."

Well, that’s quite disingenuous of me. Forgive me. The most sophisticated among them don’t argue in such crude terms. Instead, they define sex with respect to gametes.

More specifically, their argument goes something like this:

“Female” means a person belonging to the sex that produces the large reproductive cell, and “male” means a person belonging to the sex that produces the small reproductive cell.

However, as pointed out by numerous philosophers of biology and evolutionary biologists, this definition has its faults.

For one, as John Dupré has noted, the gametic definition fails to adequately explain other non-gametic sex differences. This is largely because the germ cell lines that produce sperm or eggs and the somatic cell lines that produce every other phenotype have a common-cause relationship, not one where the gametes cause the other differences. Simply put, it’s a problem of causation versus correlation. If sex were defined purely with respect to gamete type, we might expect gametes to be the underlying cause that predicts secondary sex characteristics. However, that is not the case—both gametes and secondary sex characteristics are caused by various biological systems working together.

While many people are quick to point out that the “self-ID” definition of gender is circular (which, to be clear, it often is), the gamete definition can also be accused of circular reasoning. It defines "male" and "female" in terms of gamete size and then claims that gamete size is what defines males and females. This makes it a stipulative rather than a natural definition—it does not describe an independently existing reality but instead imposes a framework that arbitrarily selects one trait as fundamental.

There are quite a few more problems, but for the sake of preserving my sanity and time, we won’t discuss them all here.

For me, the main issue is the failure of the gamete definition—or any definition of sex that attempts to capture it purely based on necessary and sufficient conditions—to account for secondary sex characteristics.

This is best illustrated by intersex individuals. Before you angrily type in the comments about how intersex individuals don’t actually disprove biological sex, that they are just exceptions, and that I should be nailed to a cross for committing this grave mistake (a punishment surely written in the holy book of rationality as dictated by Steven Pinker), please hear me out.

Firstly, intersex isn’t a single condition but a broad spectrum of biological variations.

For instance, individuals with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) are born with XY chromosomes but do not respond to testosterone. As such, their testes lack the ability to produce sperm, and they develop externally female bodies (breasts, vagina) but lack a uterus and ovaries. While they are generally identified as women by strangers, friends, or family, they have XY chromosomes and also lack the ability to produce sperm.

There are also cases where a person goes through their entire life as a male, even having a penis, developing typical male traits—exhibiting toxic masculinity, breaking video game controllers, refusing to take accountability, etc.—only to take a DNA test years later and discover they have XX chromosomes.

Similarly, consider individuals with Turner Syndrome. They typically have underdeveloped ovaries and do not produce eggs. If we strictly apply the gametic definition, they would not be considered female, despite being assigned female at birth and exhibiting female-typical traits. The male counterpart, Klinefelter Syndrome, results in reduced sperm count or even no sperm production at all.

The list goes on and on—this is just the tip of the iceberg.

Now, I know the common objection to this:

“Well, those are very rare exceptions, so they don’t really matter.”

There are several problems with this.

1. The people who shout this the loudest almost never apply the rule to themselves. They demand a strict definition, waiting for the perfect moment to strike with counterexamples. But when the same scrutiny is applied to their preferred definitions, they dismiss objections with, “Well, every word has exceptions—this is the best we can do.” And sure, that’s true. Most words are hard to define, and most have counterexamples. This has been known since Diogenes. But that’s exactly the point they miss when they assert their definitions as if they come with necessary and sufficient conditions and no exceptions whatsoever.

2. There is an important distinction between counterexamples and exceptions. An exception to the rule is different from a counterexample that fundamentally contradicts a definition. For instance, the claim “all birds can fly” is challenged by the existence of penguins, which do not fly. However, the overall definition of birds as feathered, egg-laying creatures remains intact. But if one were to define birds specifically as creatures distinguished by their ability to fly, then pointing out penguins and ostriches as counterexamples would invalidate the definition, requiring revision.

3. While intersex individuals are often considered “fringe cases,” the same can be said of trans people. If you're willing to grant certain liberties to intersex individuals precisely because they are exceptions, then it stands to reason that similar consideration should be extended to trans people as well.

Perhaps it is the case that intersex individuals have traditionally been viewed as having a natural biological variation, whereas trans people are not typically seen as having a physical condition that causes their bodies to differ from the paradigmatic "male" or "female." To me, this reeks of the naturalistic fallacy. Granting liberties on the basis of what’s natural or not is fallacious, for one, it’s extremely vague on what “natural” constuities, and secondly assigning moral properties based on whatever “natural” supposedly means completely ignores the is-ought problem. Those making this argument should know better than to invoke such obviously defunct reasoning that places undue emphasis on what is deemed “natural.”

Ultimately, I think what all these attempts are trying to do is balance affirming the identity of intersex individuals with preserving the definition of sex itself. One can only speculate as to why this balance is so carefully maintained.

Clearly, what we can draw from these half-assed, muddled efforts to preserve the identity of intersex people while defending an essentialist definition is that our intuitions matter greatly here. A lot of conservatives, at least to me, seem to underestimate the role of intuition. Despite the lack of a single, all-encompassing definition of "woman," we generally understand what we mean when we use the words "man" or "woman" in everyday conversation. Prima facie, we have good reasons to trust our intuitions when attempting to define these concepts.

If we want to construct a definition, it should align with our general intuitions and reflect common usage. The discussion around intersex conditions suggests that, despite appeals to fundamental biological essences, we consistently emphasize secondary sex characteristics, socialization, and societal roles when determining identity.